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BIOETHICAL CATCH-22: THE MORATORIUM
ON FEDERAL FUNDING OF FETAL
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
RESEARCH AND THE NIH
REVITALIZATION AMENDMENTS
In 1988, a moratorium on the use of federal funds for fetal tissue trans-
plantation research (FTTR)1 halted the promise of a cure for millions of
Americans suffering from Parkinson's disease, diabetes, and other debilitat-
ing' conditions. 2 Since the moratorium began, private and international ex-
perimentation continues with mixed success.3 In the foreground, however,
the debate rages over federal funding for fetal tissue transplantation from
induced abortions into humans.4
1. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research (FTTR) refers to the experimentation and re-
search with human fetal tissue for transplantation into humans. See generally John T. Hansen
& John R. Sladek, Jr., Fetal Research, 246 Sci. 775, 778 (1989) (discussing the characteristics
and contributions of fetal research and fetal tissue research). Tissue is removed from the fetus
after the removal of the fetus from the mother's womb by spontaneous abortion or induced
abortion. Id. at 775. After the tissue is extracted, it is injected surgically into the appropriate
organ of the recipient patient. Id. at 778. Researchers hope that the natural plasticity of the
new fetal tissue will allow it to survive, adapt, and replace what the recipient patient lacks, for
example, dopamine-producing cells for the patient with Parkinson's or insulin-producing cells
for the diabetic patient. Id.
2. See Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research] (opening statement of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman); see also 138 CONG. REC. S16,232 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992); Robert J.
Levine, Fetal Research: The Underlying Issue, Sci. AM., Aug. 1989, at 112; Patricia M.
Ravalgi, Bush Abandons Victims of Parkinson's Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1989, at 27.
3. See, e.g., William M. Landau, Artificial Intelligence: The Brain Transplant Cure for
Parkinsonism, 40 NEUROLOGY 733, 739-40 (1990) (The Chairman of Neurology at Washing-
ton University in St. Louis surveyed the international reports on fetal tissue transplantation
and concluded that the data was worthless and that the science was irresponsible); Olle
Lindvall, Prospects of Transplantation in Human Neurodegenerative Diseases, 14 TRENDS IN
NEUROSCIENCES 376 (1991) (leading researcher reported measured success in the transplant);
Jean Marx, Fetal Nerve Grafts Show Promise in Parkinson's, 247 Sci. 529, 529 (1990) (stating
that fetal tissue transplants produced a clinically significant improvement in a patient's condi-
tion); Michael Specter, Fetal Cells Seem to Aid Parkinson's Patient, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1990,
at A3 (reporting that Swedish scientists demonstrate that fetal tissue transplants may be an
effective treatment for Parkinson's); R. Weiss, Fetal-Cell Transplants Show Few Benefits, 134
Sci. NEWS 324 (1988) (stating that several researchers concede that few Parkinson's patients
show definite clinical improvement after transplantation).
4. See Finding Medical Cures. The Promise of Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research
Freedom, 1991: Hearings on S. 1902 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
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In the House of Representatives and the Senate, the debate culminated
with the passage of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization
Amendments.5 In addition to authorizing NIH programs, the $5.4 billion
bill included measures designed to overturn the moratorium on federal fund-
ing for the transplantation research.6 Brimming with controversy, the bill
was forwarded to the White House where it met President Bush's promised
veto.7 The veto was sustained when the House failed to rally the two-thirds
majority vote8 necessary to override a veto, leaving the moratorium intact
and the controversy alive.9 Modified measures were introduced in both
sources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Finding Medical Cures]; 137 CONG. REC.
H5826 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (House debate on National Institutes of Health Revitalization
Amendments of 1991); NIH Reauthorization, 1991: Hearings on H.R. 1532 Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and Environ. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 2 (1991); 138 CONG. REC. S16,228 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (cloture motion on NIH
Revitalization Amendments); 138 CONG. REC. S 16,577 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (NIH Revitali-
zation Amendments put on next session's calendar due to deadlock); Gina Kolata, Miracle or
Menace?, REDBOOK, Sept. 1990, at 174, 175 (outlining the claims of opponents and propo-
nents); Fetal Tissue Research: Right or Wrong?, REDBOOK, Dec. 1990, at 170 (publishing
reader survey results); James Mason, Fetal Transplant Fallacies, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1992,
at F3 (Dr. James Mason of the U.S. Public Health Service addresses what he considers to be
the misrepresentations of the success of and the need for fetal tissue transplants from induced
abortions).
5. H.R. 2507, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992). See Marlene Cimons, House Votes Freer Use
of Fetal Tissue; Veto Looms, COURIER J., May 29, 1992, at A1, A7. Since 1991, the appropria-
tion has increased from $4.4 billion to $5.4 billion, although there was an erroneous report of
$7.3 billion. Id. at A7. See also Malcolm Gladwell, Senate Votes to Lift Ban on Fetal Tissue
Research, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1992, at A2; Senate Votes to Lift Ban on US. Fetal Tissue
Work, COURIER J., June 5, 1992, at A2.
6. Guy Gugliotta, House Votes to Drop Ban on Fetal Research Funds, WASH. POST, July
26, 1991, at Al.
7. Letter from George Bush, President of the United States, to the House of Representa-
tives, 1 (June 23, 1992) (vetoing H.R. 2507, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992)) (on file with the
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy); Bush Vetoes Fetal Tissue Bill, COURIER J.,
June 24, 1992, at A12; 137 CONG. REC. H5830 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Admin-
istration Policy: "H.R. 2507 is unacceptable, and if it were presented to the President is its
current form, his senior advisors would recommend a veto."). On June 25, 1992, the House of
Representatives introduced H.R. 5495 as an altered successor to H.R. 2507. H.R. 5495, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The administration renewed its objections to this legislation which,
according to HHS, did not substantively alter the legislative intent of H.R. 2507. Letter from
Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, to Rep. Henry Waxman,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, (July 28, 1992) [here-
inafter Health and Environment Letter] (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law
and Policy).
8. Fetal-Tissue Veto Stands; New Measure Introduced, COURIER J., June 25, 1992, at A3
(reporting a vote of 271 to 156 in favor of the bill).
9. Id. (reporting that Rep. Waxman immediately introduced a new bill that "would re-
quire all researchers to get their material from the fetal tissue bank proposed by the presi-
dent"); Exec. Order No. 12,806, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,589 (1992); Fetal Tissue, USA TODAY, May
20, 1992, at A4 (reporting on the President's proposal for national tissue banks); Letter from
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Houses of Congress, but a Senate filibuster in the last hours of the session
foreclosed a second veto and placed the bill on the 1993 calendar.' 0
The field of fetal tissue research," currently a fraction of human health
research' 2 but with the potential for a six billion dollar industry,' 3 is the
focus of inevitable controversy. FTTR, as a sub-field, presents a volatile
combination of the politics of abortion, the international research race, and
the cries of millions of Americans suffering from Parkinson's disease and
other crippling debilitations. Thus, using fetal tissue as a potential cure
commands the interest and the passion of many.
FTTR from induced abortions distinguishes itself from federally approved
fetal tissue research because it connects a potentially beneficial health pur-
suit with a critically divisive, moral issue of our day-abortion. '" By its very
nature, FTTR cannot automatically enjoy the approval given to other re-
search pursuits, primarily because at its very core lies an unresolved ethical
issue. 1" This issue is found in the connection between the procedures of
aborting the fetus, harvesting the tissue, and transplanting it into a needy
recipient.' 6 Unlike transpiantation from ectopic pregnancies' 7 or spontane-
James Mason, Assistant Secretary for Health, to the Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, (July 28, 1992) (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and
Policy) (discussing the New York Times critique by Philip Hilts of the Administration's plan
for a fetal tissue bank); see also Michael York, Fetal-Tissue Research Ban Challenged, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 1992, at A29.
10. 138 CONG. REC. S16,578 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (Senate majority leader George
Mitchell committing himself to putting the NIH Revitalization Amendments on the Senate
floor the day following the inauguration of President Clinton). President-elect Clinton, how-
ever, is committed to nullifying the moratorium immediately. Another Win for the Zealots,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1992, at A24.
11. Fetal tissue research, as distinguished from fetal research, (the latter dealing with ex-
periments therapeutic to the fetus in utero) has been a medical pursuit for decades and is
credited with the discovery of the polio vaccine in the 1950s. Dorothy Lehrman, Summary:
Fetal Research and Fetal Tissue Research ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES (1988) at v,
9. Fetal tissue cells are used extensively in testing vaccines, virus research, and numerous
other NIH-sponsored projects not affected by the ban on federally funded transplantation re-
search. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH HUMAN FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH SUPPORTED
IN FISCAL YEAR 1990, 1 (1991) [hereinafter NIH FY 90].
12. NIH FY 90, supra note 11, at 1. "Eleven NIH institutes supported 103 projects that
utilized human fetal tissue in research for a total of $7.8 million, or 0.1 percent of the NIH
budget." Id.
13. See Peggy Finston & Gregory J. Millman, Alone and Undaunted by the Issues, OTC
REV., Oct. 1989, at 26 (reporting potential market of $6.5 billion in diabetes and Parkinson's,
exclusive of other chronic illnesses).
14. See John C. Fletcher, Abortion Politics, Science and Research Ethics: Take Down the
Wall of Separation, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 113, 115 (1992) ("In the abortion
controversy, the sheer divisiveness of the issues that arise from religious and ethical beliefs
seems irreconcilable.").
15. Id.
16. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTES
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ous abortions, 8 which are permitted by the ban, FTTR directly links deci-
sions and procedures immersed in the moral controversy over induced
abortion.' 9
This Comment outlines the debate over the transplantation research af-
fected by the moratorium on the use of federal funds for FTTR. Whether
fetal tissue from induced abortions should be procured for transplantation
into humans, and if so, how its use can be regulated is a significant contem-
porary challenge for public policy makers. Part I of this Comment deline-
ates the formation of public policy on the issue. Part II explains the content
of the NIH Amendments as a new direction for public policy. Part III dis-
cusses the potential benefits and risks of.federal funding of FTTR. Finally,
part IV addresses whether the executive ban or the legislative measure is a
sound, farsighted public policy.
I. THE MORATORIUM ON FEDERALLY FUNDED FETAL TISSUE
TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH AND THE NIH PANEL
In accordance with existing federal regulations, the first request for federal
funding of a fetal tissue transplant was made public in 1987.20 The NIH
submitted the proposal to the Assistant Secretary for Health for his ap-
OF HEALTH, HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION CII (1988) (statement by James
Bopp) ("[T]he essential ethical question before the Panel was whether or not the beneficial
prospect of transplantation research is subverted by its association with induced abortion.").
17. An ectopic pregnancy occurs when the fertilized ovum implants outside the endome-
trial lining of the uterine cavity (usually in a fallopian tube). F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 511 (18th ed. 1989). The first fetus to fetus transplant was accom-
plished in the U.S. with tissue from a baby removed as a result of an ectopic pregnancy, not an
induced abortion. Letter from National Right to Life Committee to Members of the House of
Representatives 2 (July 23, 1991). But see Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 20, 23 (oral
testimony of Reverend Walden, in support of lifting the ban, did not reveal that this fetal tissue
came from an ectopic pregnancy, a transplant unaffected by the moratorium).
18. "The incidence of spontaneous abortion ... is between 20 percent and 62 percent with
an average of 43 percent." F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, supra note 17, at 489. The incidence of
ectopic pregnancy is greater than 1 percent. Id. at 511. The fetal tissue banks set up by
Executive Order 12,806, 57 Fed. Reg. 21, 589 (1992), rely on a supply of adequate tissue from
such sources; and much of the debate on the modified NIH bills revolved around the issue of
adequate quantity and quality of fetal tissue from ectopic pregnancies and spontaneous abor-
tions for the federal fetal tissue bank. 138 CONG. REC. S16,228 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy suggesting that the federal tissue bank idea is a sham); but see letters
from leading researchers provided by Sen. Hatch that indicate that five to seven percent of
spontaneous abortions would yield acceptable tissue, as compared to the six to nine percent
present yield of induced abortions. Id. at S16,236.
19. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 113, 115.
20. CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IN-
STITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMANS FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RE-
SEARCH PANEL A3 (vol II 1988), [hereinafter FTTR PANEL II].
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proval.2" In March of 1988, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) denied the request pending a requirement that the NIH convene a
committee to "examine comprehensively the use of human fetal tissue from
induced abortions for transplantation."22 The denial of funding for this re-
search did not ban the use of federal funds for transplantations using fetal
tissue from other acceptable sources such as ectopic pregnancies or for
otherwise acceptable fetal tissue research, such as maternal-fetal transmis-
sion of the AIDS virus research.23 It did, however, institute a narrow mora-
torium on the use of federal funds for FTTR.24 Contrary to the
recommendations of the subsequently convened NIH panel,25 the Secretary
of HHS extended the limited moratorium on November 2, 1989 for an indef-
inite time, stating that "in the specific area of transplantation to humans
involving fetal tissue from induced abortions, it is not appropriate that fed-
eral support be provided."26
A. Legal Context of the Moratorium
1. State Law
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was adopted by all fifty states
between 1969-1973 and serves as the legal guide for the donation of one's
body or body parts and for the donation of the body or body parts of an-
other, the decedent.27 " 'Decedent' is defined as a deceased individual and
includes a stillborn infant or fetus." 21 The UAGA requires written docu-
mentation or some record of oral gift to ensure that appropriate consent is
obtained, and prioritizes the decision making power of the next of kin to
ensure that the interests of the decedent and the family are protected. 29 The
state-adopted UAGA is the controlling state law governing the donation and
use of the dead fetus. It appears, however, that a significant amount of fetal
21. Id.
22. Memorandum from the Robert E. Windom, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health to
James B. Wyngaarden, M.D., Director of NIH (Mar. 22, 1988) in FTTR PANEL II, supra note
20, at BI [hereinafter Memorandum].
23. NIH FY 90, supra note 11, at 3.
24. Memorandum, supra note 22, at B3.
25. Id. at A3. See generally CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DI-
RECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN FETAL TISSUE
TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH (VOI. I 1988) [hereinafter FTTR PANEL I].
26. Statement by Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, HHS NEWS
(U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2, 1989 [hereinafter The
Sullivan Statement].
27. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 1-47 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter UAGA] (The UAGA revised in 1987 has not been adopted by all 50 states.).
28. UAGA, supra note 27, § 1(b).
29. Id. §§ 2, 3, 7.
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donation and research is not done in accordance with the UAGA.3° In addi-
tion to the UAGA, a scattering of state laws exist that address the experi-
mentation, disposition, sale, and transport of fetuses and fetal tissue.
3 1
While many state laws regarding protection of the fetus were struck down
in 1973 following the legalization of abortion, 32 some states enacted legisla-
tion to prohibit the experimental use of the aborted fetus.33 A number of
these statutes were held unconstitutional, however, on the grounds that they
could interfere with a woman's access to abortion.34 In a contrasting devel-
opment, states have enacted laws that affirmatively provide for experimenta-
tion on tissue from dead fetuses.35
2. Federal Law
The Public Health Service Act (the Act),36 is the federal law that regulates
research where federal funds are involved. 7 The Act's chapter entitled
"Protection of Human Subjects" provides the main source of guidance re-
garding federal policy on federally funded human research activities.3' This
chapter was drafted upon the recommendation of the congressionally man-
dated National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research. 39 The intent of the chapter on the
protection of human subjects was to ensure that HHS did not fund inhu-
30. Kolata, supra note 4, at 176 ("All too often, the woman is not even told that the tissue
will be used for medical research.").
31. Lori B. Andrews, State Regulation of Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation, in FTTR
PANEL II, supra note 20, at D1-D20 (discussing the variety of state laws relating to the regula-
tion of research on, payment for, and disposition and transport of dead fetuses, lives fetuses,
and embryos; and noting that the most significant factor in the regulations is the abortion
question). Andrews concludes that the regulations are inadequate for the demands of the re-
search. Id. at D20.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
33. David H. Smith et al., Using Human Fetal Tissue for Transplantation and Research:
Selected Issues in FI-TR PANEL II, supra note 20, at F24-27.
34. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that Louisiana abor-
tion statute was unconstitutionally vague as to the term "experimentation" as well as unconsti-
tutional in its requirement that a physician discuss instructions for disposition of fetal
remains); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that statute uncon-
stitutionally restricts a woman's right to make reproductive choices); cf Planned Parenthood
of Minnesota v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding statute did not restrict a
woman's abortion decision).
35. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25,956 (West 1984); see also Smith et al., supra note 33,
at F26 (categorizing state legislation and noting that California gives "explicit protection for
the use of tissue for dead fetuses" as compared to other states with varying restrictions and
prohibitions).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1992).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1990).
38. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.124 (1990).
39. NATIONAL COMM. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
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mane experimentation.' ° As this regulation was being formulated in the
mid-1970s, concerns about nonconsensual experimentation on adult subjects
weighed heavily in the drafting process.4 Additionally, allegations of exper-
imentation on live fetuses raised during the drafting process exacerbated
these concerns.4 2 Thus, HHS is responsible for regulating sponsorship by or
affiliation of the government with an activity that subjects a person to more
than the minimal standard of risk, whether he or she is a prisoner or a pa-
tient, viable or non-viable.4 3
The chapter on protection of human subjects specifically addresses the
care required in research using pregnant women and fetuses, both in and ex
utero.4 As to the dead fetus, however, federal law is deferential to states'
powers requiring only that "[a]ctivities involving the dead fetus, mascerated
fetal material, or cells, tissue, or organs excised from a dead fetus shall be
conducted... in accordance with any applicable State or local laws regard-
ing such activities.",4 1 In effect, no federal law regulates the use of the dead
fetus or fetal tissue, unless such use falls under the 1988 ban.
The substance of federal law, summed up in one paragraph of the Code of
Federal Regulations suggests that the federal government has no interest in
dead fetal tissue.46 However, HHS, as the agent of the federal government,
has been anything but disinterested or deferential in the fetal tissue debate.
Perhaps this inconsistency arises because FTTR involves more than access
to dead fetal tissue. In order to make the government's position, on behalf of
the public, clear, the administration publicly modified the federal policy.
Further, NIH and its status as the world's premier biomedical center,4 7 the
source of the FTTR request that instigated the moratorium, merits public
concern. The federal government recognized that disinterested deference ab-
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE FETUS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1975), reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (1975).
40. Id.
41. Barry J. Hoffer & Lars Olson, Ethical Issues in Brain-Cell Transplantation, 14
TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 384, 385 (1991); Lehrman, supra note 11, at 2-3. The Tuskegee
study began in the 1930s and was run by the United States Public Health Service to test the
long-term effects of syphilis. Id. The subjects of the study, 400 black men, were not told if
they had the disease and were not treated. Id.
42. Lehrman, supra note 11, at 3.
43. Id. at 2-8, 14; 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1990) (implementing the concern in the chapters on the
protection of human subjects).
44. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.210-.211, Subpart B - Additional Protections Pertaining to Research,
Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women and Human in Vi-
tro Fertilization.
45. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1990).
46. Id.
47. 138 CONG. REC. S16,228, S16,231 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992).
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dicates its responsibility in safeguarding the public interest in the supervision
of cutting-edge health research.
B. Ethical Considerations of the Moratorium
The duty of ethical scientific experimentation is often in conflict with a
research race that demands that scientists vigorously compete to find the
cures to humanity's ills. Accordingly, the duty to improve health4" is chal-
lenged by the policy informing the Protection of Human Subjects regulation.
HHS answers the inevitable ethical questions that arise when these duties
conflict, potentially or actually, with three -mechanisms: (1) Institutional
Review Boards,49 (2) Ethics Advisory Boards,5° and (3) funding denials.51
For example, HHS prohibited what it determined to be ethically unac-
ceptable research by denying a research grant for FTTR.5 2 This ignited the
present controversy. Apparently, fetal tissue research had proceeded ac-
cording to the federal guidelines for decades, unless it fit into the specific
exception that disallows the use of federal funds for the transplantation into
humans of human fetal tissue from induced abortions.5 3
This exception placed no legal limits on private research, which continues
virtually unregulated.54 Private research, however, is conducted on a
smaller scale than some expected, probably as a result of the financial and
political effect of the ban.55 Countering this negative pressure on private
research was the evaluative component of the moratorium produced by the
NIH Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (the NIH
48. 138 CONG. REC. S 16,228-29, S16,231 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statements of Sen. Ken-
nedy and Sen. Wellstone); 137 CONG. REC. H5827 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep.
McEwen).
49. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102-.113, 46.205 (1990). Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) address
compliance with the "protection of human subjects policy" at the local institutional level. Id.
50. Id. § 46.204.
51. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.211 (1990).
52. Memorandum, supra note 22, at B3.
53. Id. at Bl-3 (memorandum withholding approval of federal funding for a fetal tissue
transplant pending an ethical examination of the issues); The Sullivan Statement, supra note
26, at 1 (extending the moratorium).
54. Private researchers are outside the scope of the federal ban as is an unregulated mar-
ket in human fetuses, fetal parts and fetal tissue. Kolata, supra note 4, at 175. The natural
forces of supply, demand, and private funding fuel an underground operation in what some
estimate is a traffic in hundreds of thousands of fetuses. Id. American research continues at
Yale University and the University of Colorado. George Archibald, NIH Skirts Ban on Trans-
plants of Fetal Tissue, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at A7.
55. Abortion Issue Chills Research: Fetal Tissue Fund Ban Sidelines US. Experts, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 1990, at Al, A8 (concluding that the ban had a chilling effect on American
researchers experimenting with fetal tissue transplantation).
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panel).56 Created to examine the ethics of FTTR,5 7 the panel produced the
most widely cited support for lifting the ban.
C. The NIH Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel
The NIH panel was formed in 1988 in accordance with the funding denial
for fetal tissue transplants.5" The NIH director convened the panel to an-
swer ten questions from HHS that hinged on the moral relevance of the
source of fetal tissue.59 These ten questions, and how they were answered
(i.e., the respective majority and minority positions) frame the debate as it
exists today. The drafting of the NIH Amendments, which is to be dis-
cussed in Part II, was explicitly based on the panel's recommendation that
the decision to abort should be separated in every way possible from the
decision to donate the fetus for research." The panel's recommendation of
funding the research and HHS's negative response fueled the congressional
abrogation of executive power evidenced in the NIH Amendments. 6 HHS
continues to rebut the panel logic of separability and rests its case for ex-
tending the moratorium on reasons disposed of by the panel. 62 The debate
rages on.
Not surprisingly, the NIH research community welcomed the panel rec-
ommendations. Critics of the panel, however, contend that the NIH Direc-
tor purposefully composed the panel in favor of funding the research.63
Thus, although the panel's recommendations represent expert opinions,
these recommendations must be considered in light of the views of the panel
members and of those who testified before the panel.64 In one analysis of the
ethical decision making capacity of the panel, a commentator points out that
56. Archibald, supra note 54, at A7.
57. Memorandum, supra note 22, at BI-3 (directing the NIH director "to convene one or
more special advisory committees").
58. Id. at B1.
59. Id. at BI-2.
60. Letter from Arlin M. Adams, Chairman of the Panel, to' James B. Wyngaarden, Di-
rector of NIH (Dec. 12, 1988) in FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at i.
61. H.R. 2507, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at §§ 101, 112, 113 (1991).
62. HHS Legislative Alert, H.R. 2507: Fact Sheet on Fetal Tissue Research Moratorium,
Apr. 1992 [hereinafter HHS LEGISLATIVE ALERT]; Statement of Administration Policy by the
Office of Management and Budget to the Congress (Mar. 31, 1992) (on file with the Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy); Malcolm Gladwell, HHS Official Defends Fetal Tissue
Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1990, at A3 (quoting Rep. Waxman's critique of the Administra-
tion's position).
63. Letter from National Right to Life Committee to Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives (July 23, 1991) (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
64. Id.; James Bopp, Jr. & James T. Burtchaell, Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Re-
search Panel: Statement of Dissent, in FTrR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 45 ("the scientists
selected by the NIH to give testimony were long-term NIH beneficiaries .... ").
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the background and bias of the panel members is a key factor in the ethical
weight that policy makers should accord the panel recommendations. 65 The
fact that the NIH Director selected the panelists knowing that a majority of
them supported the NIH and not the HHS position 66 takes on added rele-
vance in light of accusations against the executive branch that it refused the
recommendations of its own panel.
67
Lurking in the shadows behind the issue of the panel's objectivity is an-
other problem: the manner in which the panel hurdled the ethical questions
presented to it. The first and fundamental question posed was whether "an
induced abortion [is] of moral relevance to the decision to use human fetal
tissue for research? Would the answer to this question provide any insight
on whether and how this research should proceed? '' 68 This question de-
mands an evaluation of the pregnant woman, the fetus, and the abortion
decision. It exhorts deep thinking about the link between the act and the
agent. The remainder of the panel's report is contingent on the ethical reso-
lution of this question. The panel responded to the first question as follows:
It is of moral relevance that human fetal tissue for research has
been obtained from induced abortion. However, in light of the fact
that abortion is legal and that the research in question is intended
to achieve significant medical goals, the panel concludes that the
use of such tissue is acceptable public policy.
69
While the panel ostensibly considered moral relevancy, they rested their de-
cision on the legality of abortion.7" Eighteen members of the twenty-one
member panel approved of the response with three dissenting. 7,
The panel protected this first response with proposed guidelines that
would keep the woman's abortion decision distinct from the tissue donation
decision and would reduce the possibility of monetary gain for either the
woman or the abortion provider. 72 A further caveat was the requirement
65. Dennis G. Smith, The Moral Dilemma Of Using Fetal Tissue From Induced Abortions
As Medical Therapy: Antidote or Atrocity? (Nov. 29, 1990) (unpublished paper, on file with
Congressman Bliley's office and the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
66. Id. at 10 (citing that some panel members had previously given public support to
experimentation on nonviable fetuses ex utero).
67. Gladwell, supra note 62, at A3 (quoting Rep. Waxman's statement "'that the admin-
istration reached its position ... 'against the recommendation of its own expert panel' "); 138
CONG. REC. S16,231 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Adams: "I just would like to
hold [the President] to his word and that of his own blue ribbon panel. His own panel said,
'Lift this ban ....... ).
68. Memorandum, supra note 22, at BI (listing questions sent by HHS to NIH).
69. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at I.
70. Id.; Warren Kearney et al., Fetal Tissue Research and the Misread Compromise, HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 9-10.
71. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 1.
72. Id. While some consider "abortionist" or "abortion provider" inflammatory lan-
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that abortion providers, as suppliers, and fetal tissue researchers, as receiv-
ers, be "ethically isolated.",7 3 The panel created a matrix of the moral signif-
icance of means and ends, grounding their concept of morality on the
premise that what is legal is moral. They then ascribed variable moral
weights to the decisions of the agents, e.g., the woman, fetus, abortion pro-
vider, researcher, and potential tissue recipient, to yield an ethically accepta-
ble end.
The majority concluded that the researcher's desire to use the tissue for
the good of the patient is morally acceptable.74 A woman's equally altruistic
goal of helping others, however, does not sustain the moral acceptability of
her decision to donate. Such altruism is prohibited as a reason for obtaining
an abortion.7 5 This ethical puzzle requires that the means be distinct from
the end where the source of the tissue is concerned. Consider that although
a researcher doing transplants may be compensated with fame and fortune,
the woman and the abortion provider should not share in such benefits.
They are distinguished from the beneficent purposes of the procedure and
regulated accordingly. These paradoxical distinctions permeate the panel
recommendations and point to the unanswered moral conundrum: why con-
strain the moral motives of only certain participants?
The remaining nine questions considered by the panel illustrate how the
controversy was further framed and demonstrate the challenge before the
panel.76 The panel convened for three days each in September and October
guage, the latter is a label which those in the trade use for themselves. See Information Sheet,
National Coalition of Abortion Providers, Washington, D.C. 1990, at 1.
73. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 2.
74. Id. at 1 (distinguishing the morality of the uses of fetal tissue from the morally com-
plex issue of abortion).
75. Id. at 2, 3, 8 (discussing the need to insulate a woman's decision to abort from the
tissue donation decision and recommending that she be prohibited from designating the recipi-
ent and that funds be denied for donations to family, friends, or acquaintances).
76. Id. at 3-16.
Question 2: Does the use of fetal tissue in research encourage women to have an
abortion that they might otherwise not undertake? If so, are there ways to minimize
such encouragement?
Question 3: As a legal matter, does the very process of obtaining informed consent
from the pregnant woman constitute a prohibited "inducement" to terminate the
pregnancy for the purposes of the research - thus precluding research of this sort,
under HHS regulations?
Question 4: Is maternal consent a sufficient condition for the use of the tissue, or
should additional consent be obtained? If so, what should be the substance and who
should be the source(s) of the consent, and what procedures should be implemented
to obtain it?
Question 5: Should there be and could there be a prohibition on the donation of fetal
tissue between family member, or friends and acquaintances? Would such a prohibi-
tion jeopardize the likelihood of clinical success?
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of 1988, and for one day in December of 1988; and, after hearing the testi-
mony of over 50 experts, finalized its report by December 14, 1988. 7" The
report has proven to be the popular document in the debate: its recommen-
dations and logic serving as the basis of the legislative attempt to reverse the
ban on funding.7 8
The funding denial and concurrent ban instigated the formation of the
influential NIH panel whose recommendations were considered but not fol-
lowed by HHS. Instead, HHS sustained the moratorium and maintained
that the ethical problems of the source of tissue cannot be surmounted by
procedural controls, which HHS claimed are unlikely to be effective in the
clinical setting.7 9 This objection is subordinate to HHS' major objection that
federal funding of FTTR would provide an "incentive for abortions, and it
would create a demand cycle dependent on maintaining the legality of in-
duced abortions.'
80
Because the panel was convened at the direction of HHS, an executive
branch agency, many view the refusal of the Reagan and Bush administra-
Question 6: If transplantation using fetal tissue from induced abortions becomes
more common, what impact is likely to occur on activities and procedures employed
by abortion clinics? In particular, is the optimal or safest way to perform an abortion
likely to be in conflict with preservation of the fetal tissue? Is there any way to
ensure that induced abortion are not intentionally delayed in order to have a second
trimester fetus for research and transplantation?
Question 7: What actual steps are involved in procuring the tissue from the source to
the researcher? Are there any payments involved? What types of payments in this
situation, if any, would fall inside or outside the scope of the Hyde Amendment?
Question 8: According to HHS regulations, research on dead fetuses must be con-
ducted in compliance with State and local laws. A few States' enacted version of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act contains restrictions on the research application of
dead fetal tissue after an induced abortion. In those States, do these restrictions apply
to therapeutic transplantation of dead fetal tissue after an induced abortion? If so,
what are the consequences for NIH-funded researchers in those States?
Question 9: For those diseases for which transplantation using fetal tissue has been
proposed, have enough animal studies been performed to justify proceeding to
human transplants? Because induced abortion during the first trimester are less risky
to the woman, have there been enough animal studies for each of those diseases to
justify the reliance on the equivalent of the second trimester human fetus?
Question 10: What is the likelihood that transplantation using fetal cell cultures will
be successful? Will this obviate the need for fresh fetal tissue? In what time frame
might this occur?
Id.
77. Some hold that the panel had insufficient time to comprehensively examine the chal-
lenge before them. See Bopp & Burtchaell, supra note 64, at 45; Smith, supra note 65, at 29.
78. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 7.
79. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of HHS, to William F. Raub, Acting Direc-
tor of NIH 1, 2 (Nov. 2, 1989) (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and
Policy).
80. HHS LEGISLATIVE ALERT, supra note 62, at 1.
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tions to abide by the recommendations as purely political." HHS counters
that the panel report is but one factor to weigh in the decision making pro-
cess along with other factors, such as the Hyde Amendment, 2 and the scien-
tific promises of this and other research.8 3 Congress, however, decided to
adopt the panel recommendations and implement a legislative solution to the
controversial ban.
84
II. NIH REVITALIZATION AMENDMENTS
Congress approved the 1991 and 1992 NIH Amendments (the Amend-
ments)8 5 in response to both the executive branch's decision to continue the
moratorium and the recommendations of the NIH panel. The legislation
sought to achieve three purposes: (1) to regulate future HHS decision mak-
ing on ethical matters;86 (2) to nullify the ban imposed by HHS on federal
funding of FTTR in humans; 7 and 3) to prescribe procedures for donation
and procurement of human fetal tissue from induced abortions.88
The Amendments represent a legislative attempt to reconcile separation of
power interests; the issues of privacy, reproductive freedom, and patient au-
tonomy; the desires of the research community; consent of donor and donee;
fears of the increasing commodification of the human body; and the exploita-
tion of women. Can a policy maker incorporate all of these competing inter-
ests into a single legal formula? Can the resulting political compromise
resolve what many proponents and opponents of FTTR agree is a moral
problem? 9
81. 138 CONG. REC. S16,229 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy sug-
gesting that "extreme zealots" of the Republican party were holding up medical progress).
82. Id.; The Hyde Amendment prevents the federal government from financing abortions
except in cases of medical necessity. Departments of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare
Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434; see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (holding that the Hyde Amendment was constitutional).
83. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 4 (statement by James 0. Mason, Asst. Sec.
for Health and Head of the Public Health Service, explaining the administration's policy,
promising research other than FITR, the scientific evidence disproving the promises of FTTR,
the interplay of the Hyde Amendment, and the panel recommendations).
84. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 7.
85. H.R. 2507, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (amending Part G of title IV of the Public
Health Service Act); see also H.R. 5495, 102d Cong., 2d Sess (1992) (amending Part G of title
IV of the Public Health Service Act and incorporating the establishment of a federally oper-
ated national tissue bank as provided by Exec. Order No. 12,806, (1992)). Otherwise, H.R.
5495 and the equivalent S. 2899 are substantially the same as H.R. 2507, which was vetoed by
President Bush on June 23, 1992. See supra text accompanying note 7.
86. H.R. 2507 § 101; H.R. 5495 § 101.
87. H.R. 2507 § 113; H.R. 5495 § 113.
88. H.R. 2057 §§ 111, 112; H.R. 5495 §§ 111, 112.
89. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 11, 13, 15 (statements of Sen. Coats, Sen.
Durenburger and Rep. Waxman); Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research: Hearing Before the
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A. The Amendments As Written
In the context of protecting human research subjects where research is
NIH-supported, the Amendments again prescribe the need for an Institu-
tional Review Board to recommend approval of the research.9° The Amend-
ments state that if the research comes with a recommendation for approval
by the Institutional Review Board, "the Secretary may not withhold funding
for the research on ethical grounds.... "" This restriction was qualified by
a directive that the Secretary convene an ethics advisory board of a specific
composition" whose recommendations he must abide, unless the Secretary
"finds... that the recommendation is arbitrary or capricious."
93
Concerning the section on the nullification of the moratorium on FTTR,
the amendment states that:
no official of the executive branch may impose a policy that [HHS]
is prohibited from conducting or supporting any research on the
transplantation of human fetal tissue for therapeutic purposes.
Such research shall be carried out.., without regard to any such
policy that may have been in effect prior to the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.94
This section of the Amendments further states that the Secretary may not
refuse to fund research that complies with the new regulations, and that the
report of the NIH FTTR panel of 1988 is retroactively deemed to be an
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. Ser. No. 101-135 1 (1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman); 138 CONG. REC.
S16,235 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch referring to the "ethical and moral
dilemma" deadlocking the Senate during the cloture motion on S. 2899, the Senate NIH Revi-
talization measure).
90. H.R. 2507 § 101; H.R. 5495 § 101.
91. Id.
92. H.R. 2507 § 101(b)(4)(C); H.R. 5495 § 101(b)(4)(C).
An ethics board shall be composed of no fewer than 14, and no more than 20, indi-
viduals who are not officers or employees of the United States. Of the members of
the board
(i) no fewer than 1 shall be an attorney;
(ii) no fewer than 1 shall be an ethicist;
(iii) no fewer than 1 shall be a practicing physician;
(iv) no fewer than 1 shall be a theologian; and
(v) no fewer than one-third, and no more than one-half, shall be scientists with
substantial accomplishments in biomedical or behavioral research.
Id.
93. H.R. 2507 § 101(b)(l)(B); H.R. 5495 § 101(b)(I)(B)(ii) (adding a clause that allows
the Secretary of HHS to withhold funds for a recommendation that he finds capricious, in an
effort by the legislature to placate the executive branch's objections to the separation of powers
issue).
94. H.R. 2507 § 113; H.R. 5495 § 113.
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ethics advisory board recommendation that he must follow.95 The revised
bill specifically notes that the Panel Report is found to be neither "arbitrary
nor capricious."
96
As to the source of the tissue, the Amendments provide that the donor
must give informed consent for the use of the tissue by way of "a statement,
made in writing and signed by the woman. .. ,97 The statement testifies to
the woman's knowledge that: (1) the tissue is donated for research; (2) the
tissue is not designated for a particular recipient; (3) she does not know the
identity of the recipients; and (4) that if the abortion is induced, the decision
to abort was independent from the decision to donate.98 The regulation also
requires a separate statement by the woman in which she declares that her
"decision... to undergo the abortion is not made in order to provide fetal
tissue for research purposes."99 These statements must be available for audit
by the HHS secretary and other appropriate Federal and state officials. "
The NIH Amendments also prohibit the purchase, solicitation, and ac-
ceptance of human fetal tissue for valuable consideration.' ° ' Criminal pen-
alties are assessed if a person knowingly acquires, receives, accepts, or
knowingly transfers human fetal tissue "for the purpose of transplantation of
such tissue into another person if the donation affects interstate com-
merce. "102 The revision extends criminal penalties to the solicitation or ac-
ceptance of tissue for transplantation in the context of interstate commerce if
the tissue:
will be or is obtained pursuant to an induced abortion, and (1) the
donation will be or is made pursuant to a promise to the donating
individual that the donated tissue will be transplanted into a recipi-
ent specified by such individual; (2) the donated tissue will be
transplanted into a relative of the donating individual; or (3) the
95. H.R. 2507 § 113; H.R. 5495 § 113.
96. H.R. 5495 § 113(b)(2)(B).
97. H.R. 2507 § 111; H.R. 5495 § 111.
98. H.R. 2507 § 11 (b); see also H.R. 5495 § I 11 (b). The new measure modifies the state-
ment required by deleting § 11 l(b)(1)(D), which mandated that the woman state that the abor-
tion decision and donation decision are independent. Id.
99. H.R. 2507 § I Il(b)(2); H.R. 5495 § 11 1(b)(2), the June 25, 1992 version of the bill
assigns responsibility for the additional statement to the attending physician. Id. The physi-
cian must declare in writing that "the consent of the woman for the abortion was obtained
prior to requesting or obtaining consent for the tissue to be used in such research" and that he
did not alter the abortion method or timing "solely for the purposes of obtaining the tissue."
Id. The physician's statement also requires that he or she fully disclose his interest and risks to
the woman and that he or she attest to this in writing. Id.
100. H.R. 2507 § 11 (b)(3). H.R. 5495 limits the audit to the Secretary of HHS and adds
some confidentiality safeguards absent in the vetoed measure. H.R. 5495 § Il 1.
101. H.R. 2507 § 112; H.R. 5495 § 112.
102. H.R. 2507 § 112; H.R. 5495 § 112.
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person who solicits or knowingly acquires, receives, or accepts the
donation has provided valuable consideration for the costs associ-
ated with such abortion.
10 3
"[R]easonable payments associated with the transportation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal tissue"
are exempt from criminal prohibition."° It is unclear how reasonable pay-
ments affect the incentives of the abortion provider or the women contem-
plating an abortion.
B. The Amendments As Applied
Privacy and reproductive freedom are two of the most important interests
at work in this debate, yet they are unresolved in the legislative compromise.
Understandably, legislation cannot resolve all of the issues in the FTTR de-
bate. However, the legislature's handling of the abortion issue in the context
of FTTR is at odds with the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 10 5
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,10 6 and with the legislative intent of the
Freedom of Choice Act.' °7 The following two hypotheticals, which apply
the proposed regulation to the motives and decisions of two potential do-
nors, will illustrate this conflict.
Z has a father with Parkinson's disease and would like to donate fetal
tissue to him. She knows that she could donate her second kidney to her
sibling if the sibling needed one. Z chooses to conceive so that she can pro-
duce a fetus for tissue implants for her Parkinsonian father."08 But Z must
testify in writing that she decided to terminate the pregnancy independently
from her decision to donate the fetus, and the donation must be an un-
restricted donation to a donee whose identity is unknown to Z. ° In this
hypothetical, the Amendments prohibit her from carrying out her decision.
The bill's sponsors demand that "a clear separation is maintained between a
woman's decision to have an abortion and her decision to donate the tissue
103. H.R. 5495 § 112 (b). The revised amendment continues the prohibitions of H.R. 2507
and adds criminal penalties to those who violate the donation restrictions or finance the abor-
tion in order to obtain the tissue. H.R. 5495 § 112 (b)(1)-(3).
104. Id. § 112 (d)(3).
105. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
107. H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
108. Larry Thompson, Fetal Tissue: Should Fetal Tissue from Abortions Be Available for
Treatment of Patients with a Range of Diseases?, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1988, (Health), at 11
(reporting on women who come forward wanting to conceive, abort, and use the cells for
themselves or relatives).
109. H.R. 2507 § 111. H.R. 5495 deletes the requirement that a woman reveal her deci-
sion-making. Id.
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for research." ' Further, the documents testifying to her decision and le-
gally approved motive must be available for inspection.'
V, on the other hand, wants to donate the fetus she is carrying. She made
the decision to donate the fetus independently from her decision to abort.
Knowing that the fetus would help someone, however, did make her feel
better about her decision. She refuses to sign any statements about her in-
tent or consent. She does not want there to be a permanent record of this
event subject to inspection.' 1 2 V wants this to be a private decision.
A regulation that requires a specific motive for a legal act that is protected
by privacy and autonomy interests will not command compliance in the
abortion clinic." 3 Requiring that the physician in the clinic disclose certain
information to a woman is also constitutionally questionable." 4 In any
event, consent is not now routinely obtained in accordance with the UAGA
or other state law." 5 The motive for compliance in the clinic setting is not
apparent and none was included in the legislation. The financial incentives
deemed illegal by the same legislation currently operate against consent and
record keeping.
1 16
In this political attempt to accommodate opposing interests, the House of
110. 138 CONG. REC. S16,228 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy during
the cloture motion on the NIH Revitalization Amendments, S. 2899).
111. H.R. 2507 § I11; H.R. 5495 § 111.
112. H.R. 2507 § 111; H.R. 5495 § 11. The new measure still requires that the woman
make a written declaration as to the donation decision. H.R. 5495 § 111 (b). That statement,
the physician's statement, and a statement by the researcher as to his and the recipient pa-
tient's informed consent must be available for audit. Id.
113. Kolata, supra note 4, at 176 (reporting that many clinics refuse to obtain informed
consent to donate tissue).
114. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F. 2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and holding that the state
cannot intrude into the doctor-patient relationship and specify the information that a physi-
cian disclose to a woman-patient in the abortion decision, particularly "less important infor-
mation about the disposition of fetal remains.").
115. Kolata, supra note 4, at 176 (reporting that many clinics refuse to obtain informed
consent to donate tissue); Andrews, supra note 31, at D 18 (citing to the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix: Re-
search on the Fetus, 40 Fed Reg. 33,530 (1975), which reported that "as a matter of medical
practice, women's aborted fetuses were being experimented on without the women's knowl-
edge and consent").
116. Kolata, supra note 4, at 176. In an interview with James S. Bardsley, president of the
International Institute for the Advancement of Medicine, the nation's largest supplier of fetal
tissue,.Bardsley revealed that "[a]ll to often, the woman is not even told that the tissue will be
used for medical research." Id. Bardsley admitted, "[s]ome major hospitals and major re-
search institutions do not obtain a woman's informed consent. This goes on all the time." Id.
"Bardsley tried to make sure that his suppliers informed the patients of their intentions" by
insisting on a formal signed consent only to find that "about half of the clinics simply stopped
supplying the tissue." Id.
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Representatives legislated morally acceptable motives and thereby set the
stage for public policy confusion.' 1 7 As some experts noted, "[t]his exten-
sion of the separation guidelines of the NIH panel recommendation by the
authors of [the legislation] is harmful to both the interests of women and the
goal of encouraging research into fetal tissue transplantation."" 8 Not only
will abortion providers be wary of the regulation, but researchers will be
very reluctant to maintain private records for inspection, knowing that a
"breach of confidentiality" could be disastrous."
9
Will the NIH Amendments protect the interests of women, abortion prov-
iders, or researchers? Women want uncompromisable privacy and the free-
dom to control their bodies and what their bodies create.' 20 Women also
value giving and may view the donation of fetal tissue as a gift to a loved one
or someone who needs that tissue.' 2 ' Both of these qualities however, make
women particularly vulnerable to the abortion provider and the researcher.
The abortion provider makes greater profit with less restriction. The re-
searcher wants the freedom to search for the cure with financial support and
minimal interference.' 22 An Amendment subtitled Research Freedom
23
with incongruous restrictions on these parties will command lip service, but
will it serve a purpose beyond that?' 24 Women are the means to an end in
this scenario and the procedural controls of the NIH Amendments facilitate
that reality under the guise of preventing it.'
25
117. H.R. 2507; H.R. 5495; Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 7 (pointing out that the provi-
sions of H.R. 2507 that require certification of motive by women were not recommended by
the panel but were a misinterpretation of the ambiguity of the panel report). The authors warn
of a new direction of public policy that presents "important problems." Id.
118. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 11.
119. Id. H.R. 5495, the bill put on the House floor following President Bush's veto of its
predecessor, H.R. 2507, modifies the inspectability of the records, but does not eliminate the
problems of privacy and motive. H.R. 5495 § 111.
120. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 8-9 (questioning the "new and inventive incursion on
the privacy of women seeking abortion" and on the "fiduciary relationship between doctor and
patient").
121. Judith C. Areen, Legal Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation, in FTTR PANEL
II, supra note 20, at D25.
122. George Archibald, Embryonic Enterprises, Researchers Reap Harvest in Abortions,
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at Al, A7. "The researchers want peace and quiet in their labs.
They do not want to make it public what kind of research they are engaged in and that they
use this sort of tissue because they also fear disruption of their work", (quoting a co-director of
the project at the University of Minnesota Center for Biomedical Ethics to survey the fetal
tissue business). Id. at A7.; see also Fletcher, supra note 14, at 112 (discussing the wall of
separation between funding abortion and embryo research).
123. H.R. 5495 §§ 111, 112.
124. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 9.
125. H.R. 2507; H.R. 5495. Statements of ethical intent on the part of women do not
sanitize the moral question in theory or prevent abuse in practice. See generally Bopp & Burt-
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Moreover, "any federal law that would require written declarations of eth-
ical intent on the part of women donating aborted fetal tissue, and that
would transfer these declarations to the public sphere, is peculiar enough to
merit significant concern."' 26 Instead of resolving this conflict, as the NIH
panel attempted to do, the legislature merely transplanted the panel solution
and put it in the form of law.' 27 Motive, then, sits on the ethical seesaw,
rendering FTTR legally and hence morally sanctioned in procedurally cor-
rect cases.
Yet the concern about motive does not obstruct research ventures in the
private sector or other federally funded fetal tissue research such as animal
transplantation research, viruses, vaccines, pharmacology, and cell line for-
mation."8 Although they depend on the same sources, these uses attract
little debate. Even controversial experiments have been hidden behind the
research doors.'2 9 Nonetheless, federal funding for FTTR, and the conflict-
ing attempts to defuse the debate (e.g., the ban, the NIH panel, and NIH
Amendments) have yet to resolve the ethical challenge that lies between the
abortion decision and the transplantation therapy. And, because the funding
denial was publicly cast in terms of denying help to millions in need of a
cure, the controversy took on a political life. The legislative response to that
problem created new ones. The result is particularly unfortunate where the
lives and health of millions of patients, women, and the unborn-none of
whom are served by the politicization of the ban or the NIH Amendments-
are caught in the balance.
III. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE MORATORIUM AND ITS
NULLIFICATION
Any risk analysis of the scientific merit of FTTR pits the promises of a
cure against the alternative therapies that proceed while the ban is in effect.
Meanwhile, an ethical benefit/hazard analysis must consider the demands of
chaell, supra note 64, at 47-71 (addressing the various arguments and issues in a statement of
dissent from the FTTR Panel recommendations).
126. Kearney et al., supra note 70, at 11.
127. Id. (asserting that this is based on a mistaken presumption that women would abort to
donate).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 46; H.R. 2507; H.R. 5495. The federal regulation and the Amendments
do not address the motive issue in any context other than in that of federally funded fetal tissue
transplantation from induced abortions. Id.
129. Smith, supra note 65, at 21 (describing Case Western Reserve University experiment
on live aborted fetuses that involved decapitation); see also Gina Kolata, US. Rule on Fetal
Studies Hampers Research on AZT, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 25, 1991, at 20 (reporting on a re-
searcher who "had taken live aborted fetuses.., and submerged them in a tank of salt water to
see if they could obtain oxygen through their skin and 'kept the fetuses alive swimming in the
fish tank for 24 to 48 hours' ").
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the research race, the issue of consent, and the potential exploitation of wo-
men. Thus we are faced with a bioethical catch-22. The promises and
problems are interdependent as the success of the scientific research depends
in part on the resolution of the ethical debate, and the ethical debate's reso-
lution is affected by the corresponding success of the research.
130
A. Research Promises: Success and Failure
Clearly, the costs of the ban and the nullification are more than financial.
Although fetal tissue transplantation may have the potential to be a six bil-
lion dollar industry, it presently represents a fraction of national and inter-
national public and private health research. 13' There are not any cures yet,
and while there is hope, there are contraindications that point to the likeli-
hood of success through alternative areas of cell research. 132 Fetal tissue
transplantation is held out by proponents as the miracle treatment for a host
of debilitating diseases and injuries. 133 Some researchers say that 20% of the
population, or any number who suffer from some form of tissue damage,
could benefit from transplants. 134 In contrast, other researchers say that the
promises are false and border on irresponsible science given the lack of con-
trol groups and the questionable success of a few operations. 135 Decisions
about where to channel limited resources also enter the ethical debate be-
cause all promising research cannot be adequately financed.
1. Promises of Fetal Tissue Transplantation
"Fetal tissue is a tremendous natural resource ...."136 Human fetal tis-
sue has remarkably unique capacities that nature designed for the growth of
130. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 1.
131. NIH FY 90, supra note 11, at 1; supra text accompanying note 12; Background Mate-
rial on Human Fetal Tissue Bank HHS (U.S. Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., Washington,
D.C.) July 31, 1992 [hereinafter Background Material] (reporting that in FY 91, NIH funded
$9,767,718 of human fetal tissue research); see supra text accompanying note 5 (proposed NIH
reauthorization of $5.4 billion).
132. Letter from Bernadine Healy, M.D., Director of NIH, to Sen. Orrin Hatch (1992),
(reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. S16,235-36 daily ed. Oct 2, 1992). In letter supporting the
proposed fetal tissue banks, Dr. Healy stated that NIH hopes to "accelerate research to estab-
lish human fetal cell lines in laboratory cultures where they can be properly characterized,
assured of being pathogen free, and in some cases genetically engineered to be of more thera-
peutic value." Id.; see also Landau, supra note 3, at 733-39.
133. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Sen. Adams criticizing the
Bush administration for "depriving millions of Americans of their only hope of a cure").
134. Dave Andrusko, Spare Parts from Babies - Are We Going too Far?, Focus ON THE
FAM., June 1988, at 10, 11.
135. Landau, supra note 3, at 738-39.
136. Peggy Orenstein, Health, VOGUE, Oct. 1989, at 298, 302 (quoting Robin Duke of the
Population Crisis Committee of New York City).
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newly created human life. 37 Fetal cells are very plastic-able to change in
shape, to move to assume correct location, and to integrate functionally with
a new environment.' 3  The cells are amenable to storage and they prolifer-
ate rapidly.' 3 9 They are also immunologically compatible in that they do
not express antigens until later in the gestational period, thus diminishing
the need for immune suppression therapy. 4"° They can sprout a vascular
system that allows for the transfer and reception of blood and nutrients.' 4 '
All of these properties diminish with development and therefore make fetal
tissue very attractive for transplantation.1
42
In the United States there are more than 14 million people affected by
diabetes, 4 million with Alzheimer's, 1.5 million with Parkinson's, and some
250,000 people with spinal injuries, who could potentially benefit from suc-
cessful research.' 43 Fetal tissue may also be beneficial to the treatment of
stroke victims, epileptics, hemophiliacs, victims of multiple sclerosis, persons
with certain learning disabilities, Huntington's chorea, and some blood-re-
lated diseases.'44 Scientists use the tissue for cancer research and for a vari-
ety of other diseases.' 45 There is also discussion of using fetal cells to
combat the AIDS virus.
146
The incredible promise of the properties of the tissue and the needs of so
many patients prompted researchers to start experimenting with transplan-
tation of both human and animal fetal tissue into animals. 14' These trials
indicated the clinical usefulness of the therapy.' 48 In an attempt to test the
basic principles learned from the Parkinsonian animal model, the transplan-
tation therapy is being tested on humans; but the scientists doing the re-
search warn that these experiments "cannot be viewed as clinical trials
.... ,,49 As to transplantation for other neurodegenerative disorders, fur-
137. Curt Harris, Do We Need Fetal Tissue Research?, PHYSICIAN, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 1, 3.
138. Robert Auerbach, Qualities of Fetal Cells and Tissues, in FTTR PANEL II, supra note
20, at D28.
139. Id. at D31.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at D30.
143. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 1 (statement of Sen. Adams referring to statis-
tical data compiled by the staff of the Sen. Committee on Labor and Human Resources).
144. Lehrman, supra note 11, at 11.
145. Id.
146. Laurie Garrett, Fetal Tissue Backed for AIDS Research?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 3,
1989, at 8, 15 (reporting the speculative comments of the director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases); Hansen & Sladek, supra note 1, at 777 (citing AIDS tests on
fetal cells).
147. Hansen & Sladek, supra note 1, at 777-79.
148. Lindvall, supra note 3, at 376, 382.
149. Id. at 376.
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ther animal studies are required before the leading researchers will advocate
experimenting on humans.150
Recent Swedish experiments found that fetal cells can stay alive, but their
survivability and the long-term success of the transplant is unproven.'
Similarly, although the first experiments in Mexico were claimed a success
by the experimenting doctors, their results have been questioned. 52 In one
review, a leading scientist concluded that "[a]lthough about one hundred
operations with fetal [neural] implants have now been completed, there is
little evidence of implant survival .... The technical difficulties of the pro-
cedure suggest that neural implantation is unlikely to benefit many patients
with Parkinson's disease."' 53 In the United States, fetal pancreatic tissue
transplants in the United States have also shown mixed results. 154 Other
researchers continue to maintain that the transplants are promising.'55
Because FTTR is experimental, the effect of imperfections in the fetal tis-
sue are not completely known.' 56 "Only limited testing for infectious agents
before transplantation is possible for fresh or recently aborted fetal tis-
sue." '1 57 "It is not known, for example, whether fetal transplants might
cause cancer, AIDS or other diseases months or years after foreign fetal tis-
sue has been transplanted into the heads of adult recipients."' 58 Tissue
freshness, which is discussed further in the next section, is another factor of
success in transplantation.' 59 These unknown disadvantages and the dubi-
150. Id.
151. Id. at 383; Marx, supra note 3, at 529; cf G.C. Clough, Parkinson's Disease: Manage-
ment, 337 LANCET 1324, 1326-27 (1991) (indicating that promising laboratory animal work
has not been successfully verified in human subjects).
152. Weiss, supra note 3, at 324.
153. Clough, supra note 151, at 1327.
154. Leslie Bond, Fetal Pancreatic Tissues Used In Diabetes "Treatment", NAT'L RT. TO
LIFE NEWS, Jan. 22, 1989, at 11.
155. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 14-15, 19-20.
156. FTTR PANEL II, supra note 20, at A6 (discussing the status of FTTR and various
speculations relating to fetal cell properties).
157. George Archibald, Personal Needs, Fears Blur Old Abortion Lines, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1992, at A7 (citing the University of Minnesota's Center for Biomedical Ethics study which
questions whether experiments on humans should be done given the known and unknown
risks).
158. Archibald, supra note 122, at A7.
159. Kolata, supra note 4, at 176. James Bardsley, leading tissue supplier, explains the
importance of technique and tissue freshness:
that his group advertises for doctors who use certain suction methods in early abor-
tions to obtain particular fetal parts intact-for example, the Parkinson's disease
treatment requires fetal brains. In second-trimester abortions, he advertises for doc-
tors who use a technique called dilation and evacuation (D&E), in which the fetus is
essentially pulled out of the anesthetized woman. Because the fetus is alive when the
abortion begins, 'some doctors are squeamish about D&E's,' Bardsley says. But he
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ous success of the human experiments to date have prompted experts in the
field of neurology 16° to point out that there may well be serious risks for the
patient.161 Some reports show that "it is likely that more Parkinsonian [pa-
tients] have died as a result of adrenal transplants than have been helped.
The same is likely to be true of fetal transplants .. ,162 leading skeptics to
conclude that the lack of knowledge about controlling fetal tissue makes it
far too experimental for human use at this stage. 163 This danger is enhanced
by the lack of cell purity,"6 which is why the alternative of developing cell
lines in the lab is advocated by opponents of the therapy.1
65
In a recent analysis of the international and national stories of fetal tissue
transplant success, one neurologist has noted that although there is positive
publicity, it comes without the benefit of evidence that either clinical or ex-
perimental Parkinson's is cured by the transplantation of fetal tissue into the
brain of humans or primates. 166 Additionally, the successful animal trials
conducted to date reportedly did not adequately recreate the human experi-
ence with Parkinson's. 167 Similarly, experiments on humans are not con-
ducted in the context of control groups to test the human therapy,168 and
there are indications that "at 1 year most patients had returned to their pre-
cannot use fetuses aborted by the more common second-trimester method, saline
infusion. In this method, doctors infuse salt water into the uterine cavity, killing the
fetus before initiating labor. The problem with the saline method, Bardsley says, is
that 'we need tissue that is fairly fresh. We have to process the tissue within minutes
of the time of death.' Fetuses from saline abortions have been dead too long to be
usable.
Id.
160. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, supra note 2, at 105-07 (testimony of Keith A.
Crutcher, Ph.D. and statement signed by 41 physicians and scientists who object on ethical
grounds to the use of fetal tissue derived from elective abortions). But cf Finding Medical
Cures, supra note 4, at 101 (statement by American Academy of Neurology supporting the bill
that would overturn the moratorium).
161. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, supra note 2, at 101, 103, 105 (statements of
Jonathan H. Pincus, M.D.).
162. Id. at 103.
163. Id. at 102 (oral statement of Jonathan Pincus, M.D., concluding that "[i]f [FTTR]
were a drug, it would not be approved.").
164. Edwin Kiester, Helping the Brain Heal Itself, Sci. ILLUSTRATED, Feb.-Mar. 1988, at
17.
165. Leslie Bond, Promising Alternatives to Fetal Tissue Use Offer Hope to Patients, NAT'L
RT. TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 22, 1989, at 9; see also David Lore, New Tools in Medical Technology.
Replicated Cells from Fetuses, DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 1988 (Capitol Magazine), at 8-9 (reporting
on fetal tissue transplants as well as the hope of "immortal lines of purified and genetically
engineered cells").
166. Landau, supra note 3, at 739.
167. Keith A. Crutcher, Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Part. I Experimental Use of Tissue
Grafts to Treat Parkinson's Disease, SCIENCE FOR LIFE, June 1991, at 1, 3.
168. Clough, supra note 151, at 1327; Landau, supra note 3, at 738.
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operative state." 169 Further, the treatment of the patient is not isolated to
distinguish the brain's regenerative capacity from the effects of the trans-
plant and the ensuing drug therapy. 7' "In patients with advanced Parkin-
son's disease, who are the most suitable candidates for an experimental
therapeutic procedure such as transplantation, L-DOPA [drug] treatment
cannot be withdrawn. It is still an unresolved issue whether the continuous
antiparkinsonian drug therapy interferes with survival and growth of grafted
dopaminergic neurons." '171 Thus, what may be honestly reported as a suc-
cessful neural graft in the research community is hailed as the cure-all by the
media and politicians. 1
72
2. Alternative Therapies
Fetal tissue transplantation from induced abortions is a relatively minor
field yielding skeptical results, but extensive publicity, compared to the other
projects and discoveries in the research community. NIH annually spends
at least $9 million on other areas of fetal tissue cell research. 173 Moreover,
in specific disease research, at least $60 million was allocated to Parkinson's
research for fiscal year 1992. 17 Of critical note, then, are the other contend-
ers for funds in the research race.
Numerous projects that attempt to mimic the properties of fetal cells in a
pure laboratory setting, including research on cultured cell lines, compete
for federal funding. 17  The benefit of this effort is that it may overcome the
unknown risks of using fetal tissue cells obtained from induced abortions,
spontaneous abortions, and ectopic pregnancies. 176 Cell lines developed in
the laboratory make purification possible, proliferation controllable, and,
169. Clough, supra note 151, at 1327.
170. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, supra note 2, at 101 (statements of Jonathan
Pincus); see also Kiester, supra note 164, at 15-18.
171. Lindvall, supra note 3, at 380.
172. Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, supra note 2, at 1-2 (opening statement of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman); 138 CONG. REC. S16,228 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy that the NIH Revitalization Amendment will give "the victims.., the new hope that
they deserve.").
173. Background Material, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
174. FACT SHEET, Fetal Tissue Transplant Research, (Feb. 1992), NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT 1 (citing Dr. Mason of HHS). Fiscal year 1993 spending
by NIH on Parkinson's, Alzheimer's and diabetes' researcher is estimated at $600 million.
HHS LEGISLATIVE ALERT, supra note 62.
175. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Dr. Mason); see also Letter
from the George Bush, President of the United States, to the House of Representatives (June
23,1992), at I (objecting to the total cost of the NIH Revitalization Amendments as fiscally
irresponsible) (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
176. Kiester, supra note 164, at 17 ("Transplanted cells could even develop on their own
and form a kind of brain within a brain.").
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with improvements in genetic engineering, may allow the insertion of mes-
sengers in the cultured cells to meet the patient's specific needs. 77 The NIH
panel considered this alternative and estimated that development would take
ten years. 78 In May 1990, researchers announced that a culture of human
brain cells had been successfully grown and divided for three years in a
lab. 179
Auto-transplants, cells extracted and transplanted in the same patient, are
another option under investigation by NIH at a more sophisticated level
than the failed adrenal transplants." ° In this new development of auto-
transplantation, a patient's non-neural cells are genetically modified to per-
form a particular function that was deficient in the patient, such as
dopamine production in the patient with Parkinson's disease."8 ' Ideally, the
patient's immune system would accept the altered cells.'
The work of scientists studying the fundamental properties of cells offers
additional hope to those seeking a cure. In October 1991, the Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine was awarded to two German scientists for research
in the basic functions of the cell, which is predicted to "pav[e] the way to
tailor-made drugs."' 8 3
The brain's own chemical repair system coupled with pharmacological
treatment for stimulating activity is the subject of still another branch of
research.'8 4 In contrast to scientists who declare that fetal cell transplant
fixes the brain, these researchers assert that "the most promising news in
brain repair is yet to come.' 8 " They note further that the claimed success
in some celebrated FTTR cases came before the grafts could have
"taken.' 8 6 Similar experiments with laboratory animals showed that the
brain itself, not the transplanted cells, grew the vital cells to generate the
dopamine, thus explaining the premature improvement in patient activity. '
8 7
These new discoveries in brain repair may assist those with Parkinson's,
177. FITR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 16; see also 138 CONG. REC. S16,235-6 (letter from
the Bernardine Healy, Director of NIH Director, endorsing this possibility).
178. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 16.
179. Jonathan Bor, Hopkins Breakthrough Raises Hope for New Treatment of Brain Dis-
ease, BALT. SUN, May 4, 1990, at IA.
180. FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: ALTERNATIVES TO USING FETAL TiS-
SUE FROM INDUCED ABORTIONS 1, 2 (1991).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Lawrence K. Altman, Cell Channel Finding Earns Nobel Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at Cl.
184. Kiester, supra note 164, at 17-18.
185. Id. at 15.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Alzheimer's, traumatic brain injuries, and other ailments.' 8 The debate in
this promising discovery consists of discerning and managing the properties
of the neurotrophic growth factor (brain healing powers).'8 9
3. Ethics in the Research Race
Quantifying and qualifying the needs of the researcher bring to light the
risks that the researcher assumes in pursuing FTTR. The researcher's work
acknowledges the human identity of the fetus as a scientific matter. Must he
do so as an ethical matter? The unique properties of human fetal cells derive
from their human source and the dynamism of developing life in the pre-
natal stage.' 90 Human adult cells do not possess the characteristics required
by the researcher. Thus, the pressure to find the cure in the human fetus is
escalated,' 9 ' but does this pressure or clinical procedures morally insulate
the researcher's role?
A researcher needs brain cells from four first-trimester fetuses to treat one
Parkinsonian patient or pancreatic cells from twenty-five second-trimester
fetuses to treat one diabetic.' 92 Qualitative success is measured in terms of
freshness, as shown in recent Swedish experiments. 193 The following narra-
tive by a collector of pancreatic tissue illustrates how fresh and close to the
human source the demands of research extend:
"Two mornings a week, instead of going to her campus lab, Norris
drives to a private women's clinic in Denver, where she spends sev-
eral hours in a small harvesting room, removing tiny pancreases
from the remains of 16 to 24 week fetuses brought to her in sterile
pans from the operating room where the abortions are being
performed." 
94
This scene invites the "potential for obtaining tissue from live fetuses. Fetal
tissue degenerates as soon as it is without oxygen. Therefore, fetal research
188. Id. at 17-18.
189. Id. at 18.
190. Irwin L. Slesnik & Jal S. Parakh, Difficult Decisions: Fetal Cell Transplants, SC.
TCHR., May 1990, at 39.
191. Lehrman, supra note 11, at 10.
192. Bond, supra note 154, at 11.
193. Olle Lindvall et al., Human Fetal Dopamine Neurons Grafted Into the Striatum in
Two Patients With Severe Parkinson's Disease; A Detailed Account of Methodology and a 6-
Month Follow-up, 46 ARCH. NEUROLOGY, 615-31 (1989); see supra text accompanying note
160 (quoting president of the largest tissue supplier in the United States); see also Finding
Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 50 (statement of Mt. Bopp where he explains that transplanta-
tion requirements of fresh, intact, and sterile tissue are met by preferred collection techniques
now in employ where the brains of the human fetus are suctioned out while the fetus "lies yet
alive within the uterus of the mother.").
194. Lore, supra note 165, at 10.
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using animal tissue has involved removing tissues directly from living animal
fetuses ... ." '95 Thus, current harvesting methods are inadequate. Propo-
nents of FTTR (leaders in the field) themselves warn that an "alternative
source of donor tissue must be found,"' 9 6 while other scientists suggest that
we redefine life and death for such purposes.' 97
A network of powerful interests operate in the context of the fetal tissue
transplantation debate. A cure can mean billions of dollars to those compet-
ing to solve the mysteries of many diseases. It can also mean changing abor-
tion techniques to obtain the freshest tissue at the optimal gestational age in
the best condition possible,' 98 potentially, putting women at greater risk.' 99
From a different perspective, those fearful of the research and the com-
modification of human beings call this transplant technology "neo-cannibal-
ism.' '2°° If we add legal sanctions, which in our community can assume
moral encouragement, fetal farming is not far off.20 1 Surrounding the medi-
cal procedures are the physical dilemmas of protecting women and their
wombs. An assessment of the risks must take into account the human costs
of the transplant, as well as the potential benefits of the cure. The "natural
resource" we may be wasting may well be more than fetal tissue.2 °2
Purified and engineered cells developed in the laboratory may provide an
alternative to FTTR without the ethical dilemma.20 3 As with the delay in
testing of FTTR, complete testing will also delay the use of these therapies.
In addition, none of the research projects have delivered a cure, and the
many questions about experimenting on humans without adequate animal or
195. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 61.
196. Lindvall, supra note 3, at 383.
197. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 61-62 (citing reseachers and ethicists that propose
utilitarian definitions of life and death).
198. Leslie Bond, NRL News Special Report: Fetal Tissue Transplants, NAT'L RT. TO LIFE
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1989, at 7 (reporting that newer methods of induced abortion developed in
Sweden yield an intact fetus whose organs are readily harvestable before death). Dr. Linda
Gourash, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, states that "fetal tissue involves taking
living tissue from a living fetus." 137 CONG. REC. H5826 (daily ed. July 25, 1991).
199. Stuart A. Newman, Proposed Uses of Human Fetal Tissue, in FTTR PANEL II, supra
note 20, at D205, D206 ("[W]omen would certainly experience pressure to undergo abortion
procedures that are more invasive and dangerous to them, but more sparing to the fetus. Such
pressure might be sweetened by a quid pro quo in the form of relief from medical costs.").
Kolata, supra note 4, at 176.
200. Leslie Bond, Fetal Tissue Transplants. The Horrible Harvest, LIGUORIAN, July 1988,
at 34, 35 (quoting Jeremy Rifkin, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends, who
"warns of a society in which 'one generation literally consumes its offspring - harvesting the
next generation for spare parts.' ").
201. Don Feder, The Shadow of Auschwitz, NAT'L RT. TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 22, 1989, at 8.
202. Kolata, supra note 4, at 175-76 (discussing potential risks to women's health).
203. Lore, supra note 165, at 8; Kiester, supra note 164, at 17.
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human trials remain.2" Nonetheless, many projects compete in the race for
funding. Each contender costs millions of dollars and promises to support
multi-million dollar industries. The allocation of limited health research and
health care funds presents challenges measured in lives saved. The threshold
question of clinical efficacy, however, persists. Congress and HHS must con-
sider the promises of the alternatives to FTTR from induced abortion as
compared to its limited success as they evaluate the risks and benefits in
forming public policy.
B. Ethical Challenges in Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research
If 50 million people could benefit from fetal tissue transplantation, it
would present a serious demand for the human fetal tissue industry. Such a
demand should be considered in resolving this public policy issue.2°5 A $6
billion health industry20 6 would undoubtedly have political clout.
The impact of FTTR on women is most relevant. Public policy and the
demand for tissue will shape women's view of themselves and the commu-
nity's view of their maternity. Women's share or stake in the harvest of the
womb, an issue of scant attention in the controversy,2 °7 cannot be obfus-
cated by procedure. Simple fairness demands that policy-makers exercise
greater care to avoid exploitation of those impacted by their policies.
The goal of alleviating the physical suffering of 50 million people in
America is a worthy one. Yet not even 10% of the 1.6 million fetuses
aborted annually are usable for transplantation.208 Will fetal tissue be allo-
cated according to other organ donation models or will the pressure to cre-
ate adequate supply be too great?2"9 Funding determines research priorities
and thereby can manipulate the supply.210 These challenges suggest that the
204. Landau, supra note 3, at 734-39.
205. Lore, supra note 165, at 10 (reporting on the shortage of fetal tissue for a kidney
transplant in Denver where shortages of fetal islet cells are common).
206. See Finston & Millman, supra note 13, at 26 (forecasting a potential human fetal
tissue market of $6.5 billion).
207. See Kolata, supra note 4, at 176, 216 (discussing whether and how women and their
health will be exploited by the abortion providers' profit motive and the researchers' tissue
requirements).
208. Id. at 176, 216 (quoting calculations of Janice Raymond, Professor of Women's Stud-
ies and Medical Ethics at the University of Massachusetts, and Associate Director of the MIT
Institute on Women and Technology). Despite Ms. Raymond's support for legal abortion, she
opposes the fetal tissue research because it will exploit women by creating an "international
trafficking in fetal parts." Id. at 216.
209. Newman, supra note 199, at D206. This embryologist, who supports legal abortion,
warns that "as various interest groups become accustomed to and dependent on supplies of
fetal tissue, they will inevitably seek to enforce their rights to this material." Id. at 205-06.
210. Hoffer & Olson, supra note 41, at 385 (discussing allocation of funding for research).
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ethics underlying the ban and the NIH Amendments will not sustain public
policy in the year 2000.
1. The Consent Controversy
The consent issue emerges as one of the most complex in the ethical de-
bate over whether and how to regulate the donation of fetal tissue. What
may sound purely hypothetical in biologic terms to most people is the dream
of many researchers. Because of the altruistic motives vested in the re-
searcher's efforts, we tolerate the rationalization, that it "is going to die any-
way," 21' and legally provide for post-mortem donation. Absent lofty
motives and legal constraints, respect for the dead does not permit organ
harvesting.
We further respect the wishes of the decedent by disallowing the anatomi-
cal gift when it appears that the decedent would not or did not choose to be
"harvested., 212 Consent becomes the focal point, the moral value on which
our legal and ethical system is based. In the context of FTTR, the consent
issue impacts upon the woman carrying the fetus, the fetus, and the patient
who will receive the tissue.
Our current regard for the moral and legal value embodied in voluntary
and informed consent has its roots in the history of World War 11.213 "Ob-
taining voluntary, informed consent is the first principle of the Nuremberg
Code, which was designed to prevent recurrences of the Nazi atrocities."2 4
In fact, the world's condemnation of those crimes is the foundation of the
current ethical model of obtaining patient consent before treatment or exper-
imentation. 2 " Although Nazi pathologists did not themselves kill the peo-
ple whose brains they examined, that fact did not exculpate them from
criminal classification. 21 6 So complete is the world's denunciation of the
Nazi crimes that the New England Journal of Medicine consistently refuses
to publish the results of any Nazi experiments. 217 Accordingly, the morally
wrong act cannot be divorced from its potentially beneficent results.21 8
211. Andrusko, supra note 134, at 11 (discussing the flaw in the argument that impending
death is a license for organ harvesting).
212. UAGA, supra note 27, § 3(b)(2).
213. Harris, supra note 137, at 2.
214. Michael Specter, When Research, Treatment Overlap, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1989, at
A33.
215. Id.
216. Harris, supra note 137, at 2 ("When the Nazis on trial at Nuremberg said they only
meant to use Jewish tissue for the good of humanity, the world was not impressed.").
217. Id.
218. Specter, supra note 214, at A39 (quoting Marcia Angell, executive editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine, stating that " '[a] study does not become ethical if it succeeds'"
and that " '[t]he importance of results has no place in judging ethics' ").
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a. The Fetus
It is obvious that the decedent in FTTR, the fetus, cannot give consent to
transplantation or experimentation, leaving open the question of whether
anyone can give authentic consent.21 9
b. The Woman
In our own time, the issue of the mother's consent to donate the fetus is
most cumbersome.220 If the fetus is considered an anatomical gift which the
woman is having surgically removed, then her consent is sufficient.221 Note,
however, that she is not permitted to designate a recipient, indicating that
some value is distinguished in the fetus, or indicating that the fetus cannot be
222classified as an organ. Ideally, an organ is removed and transplanted
while it is still alive, but when the donor dead. 223 For this reason, the
UAGA prohibits the physician who certifies death from participating in the
removal or transplantation of the organ. 224 In an abortion, however, the
abortion provider both removes the fetus and declares its death, incident to
his role in causing the death. This dual role not only conflicts with the
UAGA, it also makes for a questionable determination of death in abortions
that produce whole fetuses.225 Also, procuring organs from the living fetus
or experimenting on it make the abortion process less analogous to situations
covered by the UAGA. Nevertheless, the UAGA recognizes that the organ-
donating fetus is a decedent itself and not an organ. 226 Therefore it is enti-
tled to the same regard as other decedents. Curiously, though, in abortion,
the donor is the mother and the decedent is the fetus.
"[D]onations are [to be] agreed to by the appropriate proxy ....227 Ac-
cording to the UAGA, either the mother or father is the most eligible person
219. Harris, supra note 137, at 2.
220. Id.; FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 3-7, 47-50; see also supra text accompanying
note 114; see generally FTR PANEL II, supra note 20 (most of the statements made to the
panel touch or focus on the consent issue).
221. FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 6.
222. Alan Meisel, Testimony before the Consultants to NIH Advisory Panel, in FTTR
PANEL II, supra note 20, at D174, D183-84, D186 (identifying a societal interest in according
some legal protection to the fetus).
223. UAGA, supra note 27, § 8(a).
224. UAGA, supra note 27, § 8(b).
225. Mary B. Mahowald et al., The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue, HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP., Feb. 1987 (noting that even a nonviable fetus may survive for a short time
after an abortion, that the tissue is still alive, and that the fetal brain may also be alive). New
abortion technology will allow access to an intact fetus as is currently done in a hysterotomy.
Bond, supra note 200, at 6-7.
226. UAGA, supra note 27, § 1.
227. Hoffer & Olson, supra note 41, at 386.
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to make the donation decision.22 This presumes, however, that the person
making a decision for another is acting in the interests of or with the author-
ity of the decedent (i.e., a proxy).229 The clause also allows the mother or
father to disqualify the donation decision of the other parent.2 30 Recogniz-
ing that the person aborting apparently does not want the child, applying the
UAGA model to the abortion decision seems theoretically problematic. The
interests in continuing the life and bodily integrity of the fetus are not the
concern of either the aborting woman or the abortion provider. In fact, ces-
sation of the life and bodily integrity of the fetus is their shared goal. Argua-
bly, then, the woman forfeits her authority to give maternal consent. 23 1
The consent issue for women is further compromised by the psychological
pressures involved in the abortion decision.2 32 This is where the rationale of
the ban on funding rests.2 33 Whether women will have more abortions as a
result of lifting the ban is impossible to prove at this stage in the research. If
there are financial incentives as well, such as the "reasonable expenses" pro-
posed by the American Medical Association,234 a woman is not free from
pressure.2 35
In addition to the financial incentives, it can be argued that there will be
the pressure of altruism or even charity to give to those in need. 2 36 The
knowledge that the decision could benefit someone could be an inducement
to abortion.2 37 Women have in fact come forward expressing a desire to
228. UAGA, supra note 27, § 3; see also 46 C.F.R. §§ 46.207-.209.
229. UAGA, supra note 27, § 3; see also Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 4 (state-
ment of Dr. Mason) (asserting that maternal consent in the abortion decision "belies any no-
tion of a genuine consent safeguard").
230. UAGA, supra note 27, § 3(b)(3); see also FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 7 (address-
ing the need for additional consent).
231. Harris, supra note 137, at 2; see also Kolata, supra note 4, at 176 (noting that "major
hospitals and some major research institutions" do not respect informed maternal consent
requirements in practice).
232. FTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 52-60 (discussing the ambivalence of women con-
templating abortion and the following pressures that federally funded FTTR could impose
upon them: concern for self and others, abortion provider and clinic self-interest, financial
incentives, transplant success, and corresponding social pressure).
233. Finding Medical Cures, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Dr. Mason, Assistant Secre-
tary for Health).
234. Teri Randall, AMA Endorses Using Aborted Fetal Tissue, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1989, at
Cl6.
235. Newman, supra note 199, at D206; Bopp & Burtchaell, supra note 64, at 60 (calculat-
ing that one abortion could yield $100 worth of fetal organs thereby increasing demand and
financial incentives).
236. Bopp & Burtchaell, supra note 64, at 54-57 (pointing out that the decision to donate
could become a "noble and selfless act of 'doing good for humanity'.").
237. James 0. Mason, Should the Fetal Tissue Research Ban Be Lifted?, J. NIH RES., Jan.-
Feb. 1988, at 17.
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conceive and to abort to provide fetal tissue for a loved one or for them-
selves.238 It is not hard to imagine that women could feel family pressure to
conceive in order to abort and thus suffer exploitation of unknown conse-
quences.239 As opposed to being the beneficiaries of the abortion, women
may very well be psychologically and financially subjected to the reproduc-
tive demands of tissue suppliers, researchers, and society. The therapeutic
value of what their womb can provide will institutionalize abortion for the
health needs of others and nullify the issue of consent for women.
c. The Patient
As to the recipient patient, his informed consent may be compromised as
"[it] is unclear at present whether investigators know enough about the po-
tential efficacy of [fetal tissue] transplants to provide an accurate and impar-
tial assessment for the patients. ' , 240 Some patients may not be competent to
consent and their family members may be coerced into consent. 241 The
movie, Awakenings, based on the true story of the experimental use of the
drug, L-DOPA, illustrates this risk.24 2 In consultation with the patient, Le-
onard, and his mother, the ambitious doctor tested L-DOPA on Leonard.243
Leonard was awakened from a thirty year Parkinsonian "sleep" brought on
by an anencephalic condition as a child. 2 " Within a month of his return to
normal behavior, or his "awakening", Leonard started a violent regression
that lasted many months.245 This true story reveals the risk of raising the
hopes of patients and their loved ones in an atmosphere of the unknown. As
the doctor in Awakenings confessed, "our models . . . were insufficient to
238. Thompson, supra note 108, at 11 (recounting the following situations: 1) a woman
with diabetes who wanted to get pregnant, abort, and have the islet cells of the fetus trans-
planted into her as a cure for diabetes; 2) a woman who was searching for a doctor to put fetal
cells into her husband from the brains of fetuses that their daughters would conceive; and 3) a
woman who wanted to conceive from the sperm of her father with Alzheimer's disease and
then abort to provide cells for transplantation into his brain.); see also Andrusko, supra note
134, at 10.
239. Andrusko, supra note 134, at 10. Contra H.R. 5495, § Ill (prohibiting donation to a
designated recipient); see also FTTR PANEL I, supra note 25, at 8 (recommending that federal
funding be denied for intrafamilial use of fetal tissue, subject to further developments in scien-
tific knowledge).
240. Hoffer & Olson, supra note 41, at 385; see also Specter, supra note 214, at A39 (quot-
ing Jay Katz, Yale Law Professor and leading researcher in the ethics of human experimenta-
tion) (" '[w]e might as well dispense with informed consent.... It is now practiced as a bit of a
charade.' ").
241. Id.
242. OLIVER SACKS, AWAKENINGS (5th ed. 1983).
243. Id. at 192.
244. Id. at 188-189, 192.
245. Id. at 194-200.
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allow comprehension, let alone control, of the peculiar and universal difficul-
ties now encountered.,
246
In a desperate situation like that portrayed in Awakenings, there is no
doubt that many patients and their families will try anything that may lead
to a cure. Unfortunately, some researchers will also try anything or "take
[consent] as a license to do whatever they want." '247 The rationale underly-
ing much experimental therapy and fetal harvesting centers on the opinion
that "people are going to die anyway. '24' This position arguably disregards
the protection that authentic consent intended to provide to the participants
in the fetal tissue research maze.
IV. UNSATISFACTORY STATUS Quo AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Although many people, including the experts, attempt to divorce the fetal
tissue issue from abortion, they fail. 249 The connection of the morality of
abortion and the subsequent experimental or transplantation use of the fetus,
however, does not necessarily condemn the research. The connection merely
challenges those formulating public policy to do so with that recognition.
Consideration must be given to the value ascribed by the community to
the fetus, as well as the community's responsibility to protect it, the woman
carrying it,25° and the patient in need of a cure. The ban at issue prohibits
only federally funded transplants that would purposefully connect the three
parties.2 -1 The ban does not protect the fetus from other uses, such as trans-
plantation into animals or use in cosmetics, for example. 252 Nor does it limit
a woman's choice in terminating a pregnancy for any reason. 253 Nor does it
246. Id. at 32.
247. Specter, supra note 214, at A33 (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of the Biomedical
Ethics Center at the University of Minnesota who also stated that " 'the fact consent was
obtained is least likely to mean the patient is being treated ethically.' ").
248. Id. at A33 (quoting George Annas, Professor of Health Law at Boston University
Medical School, in his critique of experimental therapy).
249. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 102 (discussing the two clashing ethical perspectives on the
separability of abortion from FITR); see also FT'R PANEL I, supra note 25, at 50-52 (dis-
cussing whether the research is "dissociable from abortion").
250. Archibald, supra note 157, at A7 (quoting Janice Raymond, a feminist who favors
legal abortion, yet sounds the lone warning that women will "'become the resources whose
bodies are mined for scientific gold, whose body becomes raw material. We are also concerned
that women do not become handmaidens to medical procedure transplants.' "). Archibald
also reports on the consent procedure used by the medical school surgeon for the Nathan
Walden fetus-to-fetus transplant: "[Hie ran alongside the hospital stretcher carrying a women
with a tubal pregnancy to convince her to give him the fetal remains after her emergency
abortion." Id.
251. The Sullivan Statement, supra note 26, at 1.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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protect a person in need of a cure from undergoing other experimental thera-
pies. If the government has a legitimate interest in any of the three parties,
the ban does not make that concern clear. The ban is, rather, the proverbial
finger in the dike with regard to FTTR.
The legislative response set forth in the NIH Amendments does not clarify
public policy in this matter either. Although they recognize that society is
charged with protecting something of human dignity, the Amendments'
compromising and confusing regulatory procedures undermine this idea.
254
Furthermore, the Amendments commodify women and the unborn, and
deceive those in need of help when then they give so much attention to an
unproven promise.255
Finally, the Amendments' limited condemnation of abortion makes for
confusing public policy. Congress laid out morally weighted procedures to
divorce the means and ends and limited these to federally funded activi-
ties.256 Rather than recognize the incongruity of such a legal enterprise,
Congress sought to pass federal law incommensurate with any other regula-
tion regarding abortion or research.
V. CONCLUSION
FTTR is expensive in human terms for women, the unborn, patients, and
society at large. Federal funding will not lessen these human costs, but it
will further confuse the entangled ethical issues. Procedurally correct fed-
eral funding will also not lessen the real risks, if in substance, the research is
not in the community's interest.
The purpose of law is to order the common good.257 A law that reinforces
our respect for women, their maternal gift, and the fruit of their womb
would serve the common good. When each human being, regardless of his
or her status as a legal entity, can be regarded with dignity, the human com-
munity is better off. When that respect is diminished, disregard is conta-
gious and will lead to horrific results. The idea of a marketplace of human
parts procured from those without a voice is so barbaric that we deny its
possibility. Today, however, it is not far-fetched. Having a healthy stock of
human fetuses in the research freezer may be the ordinary.258 Vivisection on
254. See infra part ll.B.
255. Landau, supra note 3, at 739 ("The irreversible tragedy is the death and damage to
many patients and their families produced by the extravagance of the transplantation fad.")
256. See generally H.R. 2507 §§ 112, 113 and H.R. 5495 §§ 112, 113 (delineating proce-
dures to separate women, abortion providers, researchers, and their respective responsibilities
and interests).
257. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICAE, I-II, q. 90, a.2.
258. See Bond, supra note 200, at 35.
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live non-consenting humans (non-viable, pre-viable, viable, anencephalic)
will continue behind the protected doors of the researcher, 25 9 unless we are
willing to unbolt the doors, turn on the lights, and honestly assess the human
values at stake. Farsighted, sound public policy depends on laws made in
the interest of the common good, a good that celebrates humanity and crea-
tion, not one that consumes it.
Helen M. Maroney
259. See supra text accompanying note 130.
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